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The Mediterranean Sea has been for centuries a crossroads between the three 
continents of the old Western world (Europe, Asia and Africa). This interior sea 
(mer Intérieure), as Fernand Braudel calls it, contrary to what current events seem 
to show, has united peoples and civilizations more than it has separated them. 
While the political unity of the Mediterranean world did not survive the end of the 
Roman Empire, the actual rupture is cultural and, according to Henri Pirenne, oc-
curred in the 7th and 8th centuries when Islam first appeared. After this era, as Fer-
nand Braudel wrote, the Mediterranean world has never been, as in ancient times, a 
major axis of one single civilization, but rather the frontier, the borderline between 
two closed universes, frequently hostile, but always unknown to each other. After 
1580, quoting Fernand Braudel once again, Fontenay (2010) wrote that once the 
Mediterranean left the Big History, the main and decisive clashes between compet-
ing hegemonies took place in the Atlantic and in the battlefields of continental Eu-
rope (pp. 24-25, 32-33). 
When the British colonies of North America became independent at the end of 
the 18th century, the Mediterranean region was then, as it is now, a very important 
and sensitive part of the world. However, in the first years of the United States as a 
nation, they had to face, like the European countries, attacks from the so-called 
“Barbary pirates”. Note that the word Barbary in several European languages, at 
least since the 19th century, doesn’t mean Barbarian, as one might expect, but ac-
cording to Encyclopaedia Britannica it is the geographic name given to the North-
ern African area extending from Egypt to the Atlantic, which also gives its name to 
the states that shared this area (Chidsey, 1971, pp. 1-2; Saint-Vicent, 1999, p. 
159)1. Donald Bar Chidsey (1971) wrote that «the Berbers consisted of Turks, Ar-
                                                          
1 «All Barbary was divided into four parts, and these were, from west to east, Morocco, Algiers, 
Tunis and Tripoli. There was also the semi-independent province of Barca, but this was generally 
thought as a part of Tripoli, which handled its foreign affairs» (Chidsey, 1971, pp. 1-2). 
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abs, Kabyles, Moriscos, or Moors who had lately been driven out of Spain, and a 
sprinkling of late-coming Jews» (pp. 6-7). 
It seems that privateering in its early stages was a reaction of the victims of pi-
racy against the injustice they had suffered. So, according to French Historian Au-
gust Toussaint, this was a way for the sovereigns to try to regulate this violence by 
legitimising and controlling this activity through their own authority (Saint-
Vincent, 1999, p. 159). The first letter of marque appears to have been issued in 
1206 by French King Philip Augustus or Philip II, but was only valid for the Eng-
lish Channel (Saint-Vincent, 1999, p. 159). Historian Gardener W. Allen (1905), 
however, was of the opinion that  
 
during the late Middle Ages the relations between the Barbary Powers and the Christian nations were 
amicable. They traded together and made enlightened treaties. But with the dawn of the sixteenth centu-
ry appears a change in the conditions, and henceforth a state of chronic warfare between Christians and 
Moors. Then began the period of activity of the Barbary corsairs which lasted about three hundred years.  
 
The author explains this fact with the conquest of Granada in 1492, which forced 
a great part of this kingdom’s population to go to Africa. Besides increasing the 
North-African population they also carried with them a lot of hate towards the Span-
ish. Raids against the Iberian coasts would then be a form of vengeance (pp. 2-3). 
Privateers were both European and North African, although nowadays we tend to 
consider only the Barbary corsairs, which is true in relation to the era we are discuss-
ing in this paper (Garrity, 2008, pp. 395-396). We would just like to mention that, 
besides the corsairs, the actual object of this paper, the Mediterranean had what we 
can accurately call pirates. They sailed under a black flag, no one knew their nation-
ality, and they destroyed the ships and killed all their crews to avoid leaving any 
traces. It seems that some were commanded by Turks and that part of the crew was 
of this nationality, as well as from the Greek islands (Panzac, 2005, pp. 89-90). 
In a book published originally in France in 1999 and in English in 2005, almost 
one hundred years after the appearance of Garden Allen’s work, French historian 
Daniel Panzac (2005) also advocated that although the sea had always been im-
portant to North Africans, it was after the 16th century «with the arrival of the Ot-
tomans» that it acquired an «undisputed pre-eminence», as Algiers, Tunis and 
Tripoli became the capitals of new Ottoman provinces. It is also interesting to 
quote this same author (2005) when he states that for over 300 years these corsairs 
“stroke fear” into the Europeans’ hearts and «plagued their imagination», while on 
the south shore «these seamen were considered the spearhead of Islam and were 
the pride of the Muslims». However, he wrote (2005) that by the end of the 16th 
century the Europeans’ naval superiority in the Mediterranean area was broadly 
settled, which meant that North Africans seamen avoided attacking warships, but 
instead assaulted merchantmen and unprotected coastal areas. As a consequence of 
these activities, its maritime trade was seriously impaired, their coasts were at-
tacked and their capital cities were often bombed. As Daniel Panzac states (2005), 
«these were real wars exacerbated on both sides by the religious issue, and wars in 
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which slavery was practiced on both sides». Although the majority of Western 
sources and literature talk about the Christian captives, it is fair to say that the cor-
sairs’ biggest fear was to be captured and ending up «in the Christian galleys». In 
fact, the mentioned author (2005) affirms that of the 12000 Louis XIV’s slaves, 
almost a quarter were Ottomans and Maghrebians. After the 18th century, we can 
find also North African slaves in Malta and Spain (pp. 2, 21, 23).  
Although there were negotiations between the European powers and the North 
African Regencies on the exchange of slaves, this was seldom effective. In fact, 
buying back slaves was considered to be a religious duty, so it was strongly en-
couraged, and the mere exchange was not so important (Panzac, 2005, p. 23). A 
Portuguese historian, Filipe Themudo Barata, claims in an article published in 2008 
that in Portugal, in the 15th century, “buying captives” was an affair of state, with 
the king playing a very important role, so that it became a question of foreign poli-
cy (Barata, 2008, pp. 109, 122).  
After several centuries of existence, in order to better control this enterprise, its 
regulation was definitely established in the 17th century. Privateering became al-
most institutional and was used by several countries as a weapon to inflict damage 
on the enemies’ commercial exchanges.  
French historian Michel Fontenay divides this activity, in the French language, 
into two categories, “course” and “corso”. The first word means privateering in 
general, but a seaman involved in the second activity is according to Encyclopae-
dia Britannica a corsair, for e.g., «a privateer of the Barbary Coast». Xavier Labat 
Saint-Vincent explains that this second undertaking is a kind of perpetuation of the 
crusades against the Infidels. In fact, besides attacking the ships of the powers 
against whom their state had issued letters of marque, the corsairs were always 
prepared to seize all the Muslim ships, mainly those of Northern African states. 
Under the cover of a Holy War this was an endemic activity for Malta and the Bar-
bary Regencies. With the Counter Reformation, it achieved its apogee in the 17th 
century and declined during the 18th century. However, corsair activities were re-
born, although in a modest way, in the last third of the 18th century. We have also 
to bear in mind that the 18th century was a “golden century” for both the Mediter-
ranean as well as for international trade (Saint-Vincent, 1999, pp. 159-167). 
On another hand, Patrick Garrity (2008) also explained that these North African 
political entities, commonly referred to as regencies,  
 
fall somewhere between what we generally characterize today as “states” and “nonstate actors” and 
could even be “termed as quasistates”; it also seems that their rulers exercised a various and limited 
degree of control over the territories they claimed to control, especially the Berber (Moorish) and Ar-
ab peoples of the interior. 
 
 It is also important to explain that Morocco was an independent kingdom, while 
the other three regencies «were still nominally part of the Ottoman Empire and the 
Sultan still had important influence on them» (pp. 395-396). It is probably interesting 
to recall this detail to which Timothy Walker (2012) drew attention when he wrote 
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that «Morocco is sometimes credited as the first country to recognize US independ-
ence, but the Sultan of Morocco only did so formally on 23 June 178» (p. 280, foot-
note 104). However, «American officials did not treat its sovereign status differently 
from that of Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers» (Garrity, 2008, p. 433, footnote 2). 
So, during the three centuries of Ottoman rule over North Africa, we must bear 
in mind that these “states” enjoyed a considerable autonomy towards «the central 
power in Istanbul», an independence that gave them «diplomatic emancipation» 
and the possibility of establishing dynasties in Tunis and Tripoli (Garrity, 2008, 
p.3). Donald Barr Chidsey (1971) explained that these rulers «were to all intents 
and purposes independent princes, though they had no blood claims to their thrones 
and were only military adventurers or at best, the sons or grandsons of such» (p. 2). 
Although they paid Istanbul an annual tribute, they were in fact «absolute mon-
archs answerable to nobody»2. 
Although exercising power in the sultan’s name, they tried to extend «their in-
fluence to the hinterland as they needed to have access to supplies for their «capital 
cities» and money to pay the janissaries. Due to the fact that after 1660 the naval 
supremacy was handed over from Spain to Great-Britain and France, by the end of 
the 17th century a lot had changed, their port capitals had managed to control the 
“inland territory”, they traded across all the Mediterranean countries, and signed 
treaties with several countries, prompting Daniel Panzac (2005) to state that «the 
corsairs’ period of glory was over» (pp. 10-12). 
The 18th century saw “political stabilisation” as well as a more peaceful estab-
lishment of the “system of the succession” in Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli. All this 
stability helped the development of these young states that shared similar charac-
teristics and modus operandi. In these three regencies, the Dey of Algiers, the Bey 
of Tunis and the Pasha of Tripoli whose main function was «to command the ar-
my» all ruled their “states” together with a trustworthy group of men (Panzac, 
2005, p. 13-14).  
Patrick Garrity stated (2008) that for the 18th century American minds the Bar-
bary regencies were «based on a way of life fundamentally at odds with the United 
States and the rest of the civilized world». So, it was hard for them, even for some-
one like Benjamin Franklin, to understand why Great-Britain and France suffered 
this outrage. Nevertheless, the real truth is that this quasi state of war served all 
parties involved. As far as European powers were concerned, it was good to have 
someone else do the dirty work of harming the rival’s commerce, without having to 
go to war. What the regencies cleverly understood was that this was a way of re-
ceiving tributes and presents, as long as they did not go over the top with their at-
tacks, so as not to attract heavy reprisals. On the other hand, as Patrick Garrity stat-
                                                          
2 «The words bey and dey are often confused. They mean substantially the same thing, though 
they come from different roots. Bey was the Turkish noun “beg,” which meant maternal uncle. It was 
a semiaffectionate nickname that might be given to any likable or admirable old man. Dey definitely 
was a title, meaning more or less lord or lord-governor. The offices were called beylik and deylik» 
(Chidsey, 1971, p. 151, footnote 1). 
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ed, these corsair activities helped the North African powers to maintain domestic 
peace (p. 396).  
During the 18th century, European states managed to sign peace agreements 
with the Regencies, with the exception of Spain, Naples, Venice and the Order of 
Malta, all catholic powers whose fleets had fought against the Ottomans in the fa-
mous battle of Lepanto, in 1572. Eventually, these countries ended up negotiating 
with these powers, especially after the Seven Years War. So, by the end of the 18th 
century, Barbary regencies that had survived two centuries of pressure from the 
most powerful Western powers had won «de facto – then official – diplomatic 
recognition, in total independence of the Ottoman state» (Panzac, 2005, pp. 38-40).  
The merchantmen from the independent United States had to face three threats 
in the Mediterranean, although these waters were not unknown ground to them. 
The American merchants had experienced difficulties in the 17th century, but as re-
lations between Great-Britain and the North African Regencies improved they were 
able to develop trade. However, after the 1783 treaty, in which Great-Britain rec-
ognised United States’ independence, they could not count any more on the protec-
tion of the Royal Navy. In fact, Lord Sheffield was of the opinion that none of the 
great maritime powers were interested in protecting American ships from the Bar-
bary Corsairs. In view of this, the Congress decided to sign a treaty with Morocco 
in 1786, but with the other Regencies things were more complicated (Ribeiro, 
1997, p. 325). Morocco, as we have seen, was an independent kingdom that had 
abandoned privateering at the end of the 18th century and only few captains carried 
on this activity in the early 19th century. In our opinion, as it was a very sporadic 
enterprise it did not do much harm to the Portuguese or American merchant vessels 
(Panzac, 2005, p. 201).  
Nevertheless, in the last quarter of the 18th century, ships hoisting the flag of the 
new American nation sailing in Mediterranean waters could be attacked, without 
being at odds with Great-Britain. At the same time, the United States had not yet a 
Navy powerful enough to counterattack, so it was forced to sign treaties with these 
Regencies. In fact, the young Republic’s trade was increasing rapidly, as described 
by Daniel Panzac (2005) – «several dozen American ships were in the Mediterra-
nean» (p. 40). In 1797, the United States appointed three consuls to these states, 
William Eaton to Tunis, James Leander Cathcart to Tripoli and Richard Brian to 
Algiers, who was also «consul general for the entire Barbary coast» (Wright and 
Macleod, 1945, pp. 16, 18). 
However, it is perhaps little known that in the first years of the United States as an 
independent nation, taking into account all we wrote about the quasi nonexistence, in 
the country, of a capable navy, the Portuguese fleet helped to protect the American 
shipping activity. In fact, after two naval expeditions against Algiers conjointly with 
Spain, Naples and the Order of Malta, Lisbon, incapable of signing a peace treaty 
with the Algerians, sent a squadron patrol to the Strait of Gibraltar to protect Portu-
guese ships, namely those involved in the Brazilian trade. In fact, as Spain and Al-
giers had concluded a truce, this made it possible for the Algerians to cross the Strait 
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of Gibraltar and enter the Atlantic Ocean. The Spaniards paid dearly for this cease-
fire, but the Portuguese refused to pay a tribute. In 1786, the year following the sei-
zure by the Algerians of two American merchant vessels, the Maria from Boston 
and the Dauphin from Philadelphia, off the coast of Portugal, the United States sent 
a representative to Algiers to negotiate an agreement between both parties, but as 
usual the Algerians demanded money (Walker, 2012, p. 283). In view of all this, 
the Portuguese government ordered its fleet in the Strait to protect American ships 
from the Algerian corsairs. This decision was particularly well received by Ameri-
can officials and this unilateral measure met the desires of Thomas Jefferson. In 
view of this, the Congress sent a letter to Queen D. Maria I expressing its gratitude 
for the help granted. This message was delivered by Colonel William Stephens 
Smith, son-in-law of John Adams and secretary of his country’s legation in Lon-
don. He had the honour of being received by the Queen and the Royal Family. Dur-
ing the audience, the protection to American merchantmen by the Portuguese fleet 
was reaffirmed and, at the same time, the Court of Lisbon expressed its desire to 
maintain good relations between both countries. In the report he sent to the United 
States government, Smith drew attention to the importance of Portugal’s geograph-
ic position, the advantage of having its ports open to American shipping, and the 
Portuguese attitude towards the corsairs. 
It was only because Portugal insisted that the federal government had to appoint 
David Humphreys (who among other things was aide-de-camp and a close friend 
of George Washington) Resident Minister with the Portuguese Court. We believe 
that one of the reasons why the United States complied with Portuguese wishes has 
to do with the fact that Lisbon, the capital, was a seaport, making it a good place to 
find information about the North African Regencies, policies and activities. Be-
sides this being also the opinion advocated by Thomas Jefferson since at least 
1785, Humphreys stated that this city was the best place to establish communica-
tions between the United States and Morocco (Ribeiro, 1997, pp. 633-638, 709). 
This is even more interesting if we think that Patrick Garrity (2008), in the pa-
per we have been quoting, says that although the United States tried to obtain help 
from other European powers, France and the Netherlands turned it down. In fact, 
Britain did not want to have any post-war contacts with its ex-colonies and Lord 
Sheffield stated that he knew how valuable and strategic trade with the regencies 
was, and that any of the great powers would be interested in protecting American 
shipping (pp. 397-398). We would also like to stress that besides Portugal, the 
Netherlands and Spain also protected American vessels, which used forged or 
bought passes to pretend to be British merchantmen. The Algerians could not tell 
the difference, considering that both spoke English, and this avoided them the risk 
of being captured (Gardner, 1905, p. 15). 
When the peace agreement was signed with Morocco, United States officials, like 
Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin and John Adams, were trying to conclude a 
treaty of Friendship and Trade with Portugal. Americans entertained high expecta-
tions with this agreement, so did the merchants that lived in Portugal and traded with 
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North America since colonial times. John Jay, Secretary of State in 1787 even wrote 
in one of his dispatches that «the treaty with Portugal it seems meets with obstacles. I 
wish they may not be insuperable, for I view a commercial connection with that na-
tion and also with Spain, as beneficial to all the parties» (Ribeiro, 1997, 325)3 
Two years earlier Thomas Jefferson had stated that all the negotiations in order 
to develop trade with Portugal would fail if Algerian plundering could not be 
avoided (Cappon, L. (ed.), 1987, p.103; Magalhães, 1991, p. 41; Ribeiro, 1997, p. 
325). Jefferson also thought that these political entities were only «partially cov-
ered by the law of nations» while John Adams regarded them as «nests of bandity». 
On the other hand, we must not forget that there were frequent dissensions between 
these regencies, except when they had to deal with the Christian countries (Garrity, 
2008, pp. 396-397).  
Thomas Jefferson believed that before the Declaration of Independence trade 
with the Mediterranean was very important, as the then British colonies sent to this 
part of the world about 1/6 of the total of the wheat and flour exported and 1/4 «in 
value of dried and picked fish». It employed between 80 and 100 ships, annually, 
amounting to about 20.000 tons and 1,200 seamen. American officials wanted to 
divert «their merchants, financiers, and shippers» from the «English-oriented 
trade» and the Mediterranean seemed a good option (Garrity, 2008, p. 398). 
Both John Adams and Thomas Jefferson realised that «the two agents at Algiers» 
were «money and fear» and that Tripoli was asking a very high price to sign a peace 
treaty. However, in the early 1780s, the US Confederation Congress had neither the 
money nor a powerful navy at its service. Earlier on, Adams had been in favour of 
paying a tribute to these Regencies, as the country had no power to fight them. He 
argued that the losses in money and reputation would be less than if United States 
shipping continued to be subject to these attacks. On the other hand, trade with North 
African states was not so important for the Americans. If these African States had to 
face a powerful navy, they would lose more than the United States. 
Thomas Jefferson was not of the same opinion, but rather in favour of military 
measures. He therefore thought that if «a league of second–tier naval powers, such as 
Portugal, Naples, Venice, Malta, Sweden and Denmark, joined by the United States» 
it would be a blockading force with the expenses being shared by all those involved. 
On the other hand, with such a united front it would be very difficult for the Regen-
cies to launch attacks against the European countries (Panzac, pp. 114, 116). This 
plan did not work as Spain had signed a treaty with Algiers, and Great-Britain as well 
as France did not show much interest in it (Garrity, 2008, pp. 398-400). Thomas Jef-
ferson very realistically thought that once the American administration began to ac-
cept this kind of blackmail there would be no end to it. He even refused the offer 
                                                          
3 N.A.R.A. General Records of the Department of State, Central files, Diplomatic and Consular 
Instructions. Foreign Letters of the Continental Congress and the Department of State, 1785-1790, 
vol. 1 (14January 1785 – 23 December 1790), (National Archives microfilm publication, M61, roll 1), 
p. 234-235. Dispatch from the Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs, John Jay, to William Carmichael, 
New York, 4 January 1787. 
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made to him by General Lafayette to command a naval expedition against these “pi-
rates” as he knew he had to deal with the «jealousies of the European powers» along 
with the isolationism and stinginess of his own government (Wright and Macleod, 
1945, p. 23; Allen, 1905, p. 40). By 1789, with the new Constitution, the Federal 
Government had more tools to deal with this threat, but, at first, George Washing-
ton’s administration was more in favour of negotiating than using force, so the estab-
lishment of a powerful navy was delayed (Garrity, 2008, p. 400). 
In fact, in 1791 Thomas Barclay was appointed special envoy to the Emperor of 
Morocco, with the main objective of obtaining the ratification of the treaty his pre-
decessor had signed with the United States in 1787.  
Adam’s negotiation penchant can also be seen when in 1791 he tried to free 
Americans held captive in Algiers, as until then negotiations had been conducted by 
the Spanish consul in that city, but Jefferson sent funds so that all the expenses could 
be paid by David Humphreys (Humphreys, 1917, p. 12; Ribeiro, 1997, p. 710). At 
the same time, Humphreys was informed of the state of the negotiations with Algiers 
for the release of the 24 American prisoners in that Regency and that until that mo-
ment those talks had been conducted by the Spanish consular agent. Unfortunately, 
Thomas Barclay only managed to travel in November, but only went as far as Gibral-
tar, having to return to Lisbon where he died in 1793 (Ribeiro, 1997, pp. 709-711).  
After Barclay’s death, Humphreys being one of the two people who, in Europe, 
knew about the contents of the dispatches, he decided to take the matter into his 
own hands. The other person who had full knowledge of the matter was Thomas 
Pinckney, at that time American representative in Great-Britain and later also En-
voy Extraordinary to Spain. Although David Humphreys was in possession of all 
the dispatches, he was not able to find the whereabouts of the presents the United 
States government had sent to be given to the Emperor of Morocco. He even went 
to Gibraltar, from where he reported the Moroccan political situation to the Secre-
tary of State and all the efforts he had made to free the captives held in Algiers. As 
he was also annoyed with the way the Algerian affairs were being conducted, he 
offered to conduct negotiations in that capacity. In fact, he was chosen to negotiate 
with Algiers and Morocco at the same time as Captain Nathaniel Cutting was ap-
pointed as his Secretary. As soon as he arrived in Lisbon in late August 1793, Hum-
phries decided to travel to Gibraltar, where he hoped to reach the Spanish city of Ali-
cante so that he could travel to Algiers. The mission was however aborted as the Dey 
did not allow him to sail to his capital city. This setback changed Humphrey’s view 
on how to deal with this problem, making him support the creation of a naval force 
and to awaken the Americans to this outrage (Ribeiro, 1997, pp. 711-713). 
In 1793, Portugal’s Royal Court was caught by surprise when it was informed 
that the English Consul, contrary to Lisbon’s wishes and without its previous 
knowledge, had concluded a one-year truce with Algiers. Minister Sousa Coutinho 
also guaranteed that nothing would be paid in cash or in the form of presents. Be-
sides, if the truce was ever to be signed, Portuguese officials would not allow Alge-
rian ships to enter the Atlantic for a period of three months. After this interview, 
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David Humphreys was almost sure these conditions would be rejected by the Dey 
(Ribeiro, 1997, pp. 717-719, 725). 
This peace agreement seriously impacted on the security in the Atlantic. In fact, 
as soon as the truce between Portugal and Algiers was concluded on the night of 5 
to 6 October 1793 «four Frigates, three Xebecks and a Brig of 20 guns have passed 
the streights into the Atlantic». Having received this information from David Hum-
phreys, Consul Edward Church, after warning all the American captains in Lisbon, 
had an interview with Luís Pinto de Sousa Coutinho, who once again reaffirmed 
that the Portuguese Court was not happy with this arrangement, much less with the 
fact that Portugal had to pay «the Dey one third as much as he [received] annually 
from the court of Spain». At the same time, Portuguese authorities had increased 
the number of armed vessels «on the Mediterranean station» and also because they 
had no faith or great expectations in the ceasefire. This was also the opinion Ed-
ward Church conveyed in a dispatch to Thomas Jefferson on 30 October 1793. At 
the same time, Church had received intelligence from a «staunch friend of Ameri-
ca» that there was «an infernal combination in Europe» against the United States, 
being France the only country not involved in it (Swanson, 1939, vol. I, pp. 46-49; 
Ribeiro, 2001, pp. 338-341). In spite of these dangers, the craving for profit, as 
well as the misleading publicity made by British merchants in United States news-
papers, many Americans continued to trade in the Mediterranean, even if they 
could now be captured in Portuguese waters (Ribeiro, 2001, pp. 341-342). 
Before all these difficulties, both David Humphreys and Captain O’Brien wrote 
letters to President George Washington and to Vice-President Thomas Jefferson 
advising them that the United States needed a navy to protect American merchant-
men, to allow the country to trade. Consul Edward Church also expressed the same 
opinion to Thomas Jefferson. In view of this, the Congress voted for the establish-
ment of a naval force to protect American ships from the Algerians. The decisions 
issued by both Houses of Congress are very important, as they mark the beginning 
of the United States navy, leading to what it is today (Allen, 1905, pp. 47-50; 
Chidsey, 1971, p. 25; Garrity, 2008, p. 401; Ribeiro, 2001, p. 342). 
The American press such as the Baltimore Daily Intelligencer and two Boston 
newspapers, the Independent Chronicle as well as the Universal Advertiser, openly 
accused Great-Britain of being behind this affair. The Baltimore Daily Intelligenc-
er went as far as to also implicate Spain. When Thomas Pinckney asked the British 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs for an explanation, Lord Grenville started by saying 
that London had intervened in response to a request from the Court of Lisbon and 
ended up confessing that this truce was highly advantageous to Britain, as the 
country needed the cooperation of the Portuguese Navy (Ribeiro, 1997, p. 720). 
Humphries was also sure of Portugal’s good faith as in letter written to the Secre-
tary of State Edmund Randolph he clearly states:  
 
Mr. Logie himself acknowledged to me, that rather he or anyone else was ever authorised on the 
part of Portugal to promise one single farthing of money for a peace with Algiers. And I only ask you, 
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in the name of common sense, whether Mr. Logie, or anyone else, could seriously expect or design to 
make that peace, without giving any money? (Ribeiro, 1997, p. 730)4.  
 
We agree with Gardner Allen (1905) when he says that «both Colonel Hum-
phreys and Edward Church were of the opinion that this truce was made through 
the influence of the British consul at Algiers and without the authority of the Por-
tuguese government». The Secretary for Foreign Affairs assured them that alt-
hough Portugal was eager for peace, he wanted to allow time to warn their friends  
 
but the British Court, zealous overmuch for the happiness of the two nations, Portugal and Algiers, in 
order to precipitate this important business very officiously authorized Charles Logie, the British con-
sul-general and agent at Algiers, not only to treat, but to conclude, for and in behalf of this Court, not 
only without authority, but even without consulting it (p. 47).  
 
Portuguese officials, however, had not thought convenient to reject the cease-
fire, but «they wou’d not be displeased if a plausible pretence shou’d offer to break 
it». In fact, now that Great-Britain did not need a powerful force this served both 
British and Spanish interests (Swanson, 1939, vol. I, p. 52; Ribeiro, 2001, p. 338)5. 
Consul Edward Church is harsher in his comments about this affair, as he wrote: 
«the conduct of the British in this business leaves no room to doubt or mistake their 
object, which was evidently aimed at us» (Allen, 105, p. 47). 
Humphreys gave the British the benefit of the doubt saying that Consul Logie 
acted «on his own responsibility» and the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Lord 
Grenville, assured Charles Pinckney that the British government did not want to 
harm the Americans. It had simply done what had been asked «by their friend and 
ally the Court of Portugal» to achieve peace with Algiers. Following this request, 
Consul Logie was entrusted to do all he could to achieve this goal. As a peace trea-
ty could not be signed immediately, he was able to negotiate a truce. 
As we can see, there are two contradictory versions, the Portuguese one and the 
British one. The Americans were sure that this agreement had been concluded 
without Portugal’s knowledge and that the real aim was to damage American trade. 
After the truce was concluded, Edward Church tried to warn American shipping 
about the danger they were incurring in and managed to get from the Portuguese au-
thorities a convoy for several of these vessels. Of course these escorts depended on 
                                                          
4 N.A.R.A. General records of the Department of State, Central files, Despatches from United 
States Ministers to Portugal, vol. 4 (30 January – 29 November 1794) (National Archives microfilm 
publication, M43, roll 3). Letter from the minister resident Colonel David Humphreys to Captain 
Richard O'Brien, dated Lisbon, 3 March 1794, annexed to dispatch no. 113 from the minister resident, 
Colonel David Humphreys, to the Secretary of State, Edmund Randolph, dated Lisbon, 6 March 1794 
5 When we say that this served Spanish interests, we base ourselves on the following statement by 
Edward Church «Upon the presumption that such was the general opinion, and my knowledge that the 
Spanish Ambassador when at Court on the 15th Instt had been treated rather roughly by all the Nobility 
present when he congratulated the Prince on the happy event of the Truce.» (Swanson, 1939, vol. I, p. 
52). 
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“occasional arrangements” (Allen, 1905, pp. 47-48; Garrity, 2008, p. 401). Note should 
also be made that both the British and the Spanish Ambassadors were against the Por-
tuguese granting them a convoy, but as Edward Church puts it, «the British have lost 
ground by this left-handed policy» and the Minister and Secretary of State for the Navy 
Martinho de Melo e Castro was in favour of giving protection to American ships. At 
the same time, Church stated that the general opinion was not very much in favour of 
the United Kingdom and that this was a good moment to suggest a new commercial 
treaty to Portugal. Finally, the Secretary of War and Foreign Affairs Luís Pinto de Sou-
sa Coutinho allowed United States ships to be escorted by the Portuguese navy (Swan-
son, 1939, vol. I, p. 53; Ribeiro, 2001, p. 338). 
Although tired of this endless affair, David Humphreys was worried about the 
fate of the captives in Algiers and the security of the American merchantmen in the 
Mediterranean. He therefore continued to advise US officials on how to raise mon-
ey to pay the ransoms, asking the European consuls in this Regency for help, and 
Minister Sousa Coutinho for the protection of the Portuguese squadron in the Strait 
of Gibraltar. It seems that Lisbon received this request favourably, which led Presi-
dent George Washington to mention this in the address he made to the Congress on 
28 February 1795. 
The information received from Algiers urged the United States to sign a peace 
treaty with the Dey. Besides the poor conditions under which the American captives 
were being held, there was always the possibility that both Spanish and British could 
make the negotiations more difficult, as these countries feared American competition 
and, moreover, it was not possible to trust either the French or the Swedish. 
Needing money to negotiate with Algiers, which he could not obtain in Europe, 
and dreading a war between Portugal and France or a peace agreement between the 
Portuguese Court and the Dey, David Humphreys decided to travel to the United 
States with the intention of diverting the attention of those who did not want Ameri-
cans to obtain peace, and to be able to talk directly with President George Washing-
ton about this sensible subject. Although his attitude was criticised, it was decided 
that the United States should use France’s good offices. Joseph Donaldson, consul in 
Tunis and Tripoli, settled peace with Algiers and a treaty was finally signed in Sep-
tember 1795, although all the problems with this Regency were only completely 
solved when the treaty was ratified in 1796 (Ribeiro, 1997, pp. 737-749). 
We must also take in consideration that for North African powers privateering 
had at the same time a religious and a political dimension, but, of course, as Daniel 
Panzac (2005, p. 101) writes, «its primary purpose was obviously an economic 
one». When chased by corsairs, the American ships, which already had to avoid the 
British Navy in the Atlantic, in the Mediterranean they had to seek shelter in Italian 
ports for the first 40 years after the Declaration of Independence, the United States 
were involved in numerous negotiations, as well as with wars with North African 
Regencies (Wright & Macleod, 1845, pp. 16, 18). 
James Simpson, American consul in Gibraltar, tried to renovate the treaty with 
Morocco, but as a war was going on between two brothers, pretenders to the 
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throne, this proved to be a difficult mission, especially for a country like the United 
States, which did not have a strong navy in the region. Nevertheless, in 1795 he 
managed to sign an agreement with this power (Ribeiro, 1997, p. 745). By 1796, 
before the real possibility of a war between Portugal and Spain, the Portuguese 
squadron had to stop patrolling the Strait of Gibraltar, making it possible for the 
Algerians to enter the Atlantic (Ribeiro, 1997, pp. 749-750). 
Allan Gardner (1905) alleged that England did this on purpose to allow «the 
Algerines to cruise against Americans» (p.15). Allan Garrity, (2008) quoting Ray 
Irwin, is of the opinion that this mischievous intentional attitude caused great harm 
to American trade, as the corsairs captured 11 ships and 100 seamen, while the 
rates of maritime insurance increased three times (p. 401). 
At this stage, we should point out that although the laws passed in the Congress, 
they met with a lot of internal opposition, even if they paid off, as in 1795 a treaty 
with Algiers was signed, according to which the United States had to pay a yearly 
tribute of $642 000 and send naval stores worth $21 600, as well as “providing” a 
frigate and other “presents”. In this way they managed to buy the Dey’s good of-
fices in making deals with the other Barbary powers, which, in fact, allowed trea-
ties to be signed with Tunis and Tripoli. In a letter dated 9 January 1799, Colonel 
David Humphreys also credits the good offices of the Portuguese Consul in Tripoli, 
D. Bernardo de Sousa, for the achievement of this peace. This is especially im-
portant for the United States as the truce between Portugal and Algiers had ended 
in April 1794, allowing American hopes of obtaining a peace agreement with that 
Regency to be revived (Ribeiro, 1997, pp. 744, 835). 
Patrick Garrity (2008) stated that by 1797 the United States had established 
several treaties with the North African powers, which seemed to make it safe for 
Americans in the Mediterranean. However, the bases of this structure were not very 
strong and it quickly collapsed. To begin with, there was a great disparity between 
the terms of the agreements between Algiers and the other powers, which obvious-
ly made it particularly difficult. The United States were very slow in sending the 
presents and tributes they had agreed to pay, some of them arriving «months and 
years late» and many times were «unsatisfactory and incomplete».  
In fact, when the US frigate George Washington arrived in Algiers in Septem-
ber 1800 with a long-delayed tribute, it triggered a series of demands from the 
three Regencies, but as they were not fulfilled by the Americans the United States 
Consul James Leander Cathcart warned his government and his compatriots «that 
hostilities were now likely» to restart (pp. 402-404). 
In view of these circumstances, the consuls in North Africa advised to Washing-
ton on how to successfully handle this threat to American ships in the Mediterranean, 
recommending, at the same time, that the United States should review their relation-
ship with the Regencies, all having come to the conclusion that the use of force 
would be a long lasting solution. This was also the opinion of David Humphreys, res-
ident minister in Lisbon, while John Quincy Adams, American minister in Prussia, 
Conflict and Peace in the Mediterranean 
171 
according to a Swedish proposal, advocated a naval cooperation, in order to protect 
commercial shipping in the Mediterranean (Garrity, 2008, pp. 404-406). 
On 15 July 1799, William Eaton, US consul in Tunis, reported that on 29 June 
the Portuguese and Sicilian Ambassadors had left for their countries and that Por-
tugal had «concluded a peace agreement with this regency, for three years». For 
him, this was cause for alarm, as there was no one «to block the corsairs within the 
straits» and so, with a certain amount of exaggeration he wrote that no one could or 
would prevent them «from cruising from the cape of Good Hope to the Orkney Is-
lands» (Swanson, 1939, vol. I, p. 332). This, together with the fact that Sweden had 
also signed an agreement with Tripoli, made the Secretary of State Timothy Picker-
ing believe that the only way to handle Barbary powers was through force. But in 
fact, neither the United States nor the Barbary Regencies were pleased with the 
«existing relationship» (Garrity, 2008, pp. 406-407). 
It is quite interesting to note the perception that Consul Eaton had of the Portuguese 
naval power in the Mediterranean in 1799, which in our opinion does not fit the facts. 
In fact, he wrote that «Portugal not only blocks them [the corsairs] within their seas, 
but dictates terms to them under their own walls» (Wright and Macleod, 1945, p. 48). 
In October 1801, Eaton was worried because Tunis «had broken» a truce with 
Portugal and had consequently sent 6 vessels against Portuguese ships. In view of 
these circumstances, he feared that American ships would be the next prey. The 
goods American had promised to send to Tunis arrived late, upsetting the Bey. Had 
the boat with the supplies, convoyed by the George Washington, not arrived, Eaton 
was almost sure that the expedition sent against Portuguese vessels would instead 
be used against Americans (Wright & Macleod, 1945, pp. 96). 
In the same year, Thomas Jefferson, who had always been in favour of a firmer 
policy in respect of Mediterranean privateering, was inaugurated as the 3rd Presi-
dent of the United States, at a time when the Quasi-War with France had been re-
solved. Under these circumstances, as the American Navy was free from any duty, 
he was able to send to the Mediterranean «a squadron of three frigates and a 
schooner». The squadron commander’s Richard Dale had instructions to prevent 
the Barbary powers to disregard the existing treaties and to protect American ships 
and trade. To achieve this, he had orders to use the most extreme means, like sink-
ing, burning or destroying the ships of the North African powers who did not re-
spect the agreements in force. As Tripoli was now the major enemy, Richard Dale 
had instructions that in case of war he was authorised to blockade the port of this 
Regency’s capital city. At the same time messages were sent to Morocco, Algiers 
and Tunis assuring them those American vessels were not in the Mediterranean to 
threaten them. However, through some of Thomas Jefferson’s letters written to 
members of Congress, Patrick Garrity lets us know that the President did not be-
lieve that sending the squadron to the Mediterranean would solve anything. 
In fact, as soon as this naval force arrived in Gibraltar, Commander Dale 
learned of the declaration of war to the United States and that corsairs were chasing 
American ships. However, the arrival of this unexpected squadron caught them un-
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awares. At first, the Americans managed to capture some Tripolitan vessels, con-
voy their own ships in the Mediterranean, and even put on a show of force before 
Tripoli, by blockading its port, while at the same time they were trying to negotiate 
with the Pasha. When winter came, Commander Dale had to return to the United 
States and the mission was considered a success, as his presence in Mediterranean 
waters plus the cash given had prevented Algiers and Tunis from attacking Ameri-
can ships (Garrity, 2008, pp. 407-410).  
In spite of all this, American consuls in North Africa were not so enthusiastic 
about the success of this display of force against Tripoli, as the surprise factor had 
not been well exploited. Even the Danes were of the opinion that if Jefferson de-
cided to reduce the Navy, Americans would have to accept all the Barbary Regen-
cies’ demands. Under these circumstances, the United States had only one option 
left: take military action. 
Although Jefferson’s administration had plans for another display of force, the 
fact is that by 1802-1803, as Patrick Garrity wrote, «the American strategic posi-
tion in the Mediterranean, apparently so promising in 1801, deteriorated rapidly». 
At the same time, Sweden and France were making peace with the Pashaw, by pay-
ing tributes in money and ships. The commander of the American squadron, Rich-
ard Morris, then in the Mediterranean, seemed not to be acting properly or accord-
ing to orders received. On another hand, the blockade of Tripoli caused friction 
with Algiers and with Tunis, and lead Morocco to declare war on the United States. 
Pressed by the Louisiana question, as Napoleonic France had taken possession of 
this territory from Spain, which was seen by the American administration as a dan-
ger much closer to home, as well as the Treaty of Amiens, Jefferson decided on a 
combined solution: to negotiate with Tripoli and have a more forceful position in 
the Mediterranean (Garrity, 2008, pp. 407-416). 
In 1803, the Americans sent another squadron to the Mediterranean under the 
command of Commodore Edward Preble, with the purpose of putting more pressure 
on Tripoli. However, as soon as he arrived he had to deal with Morocco, as the cor-
sairs of this country had, without any declaration of war by the Emperor, captured 
American ships and imprisoned the US consul. Finally, when these matters were set-
tled, any hopes of reaching an agreement with Tripoli were almost ruined.  
In the meantime, the Tripolitans captured the U.S. frigate Philadelphia and the 
Pasha demanded a huge ransom to free both ship and crew, leading to a long period 
of negotiations. The Americans, however, had in the meantime scored a huge tri-
umph, as they managed to burn the Philadelphia down right in the middle of Tripo-
li’s harbour. Without the help of any of the European consuls in Tripoli, except for 
the Danish representative, Commodore Preble undertook a campaign against this 
Regency, by starting to bombard the capital on 3 August 1804, which was followed 
by other attacks over the next few weeks, at the same time as the negotiations were 
taking place. 
After the replacement of Commodore Preble by Commodore Barron, who was 
in command of a mightier force, Americans interfered in the domestic affairs of 
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Tripoli by supporting the Pasha’s brother’s pretensions to the throne and opened a 
second front by launching a land attack. Finally, negotiations conducted by the 
American Consul-General Tobias Lear led to the signing of a peace treaty with 
Tripoli. The United States deployment of force before Tunis also led to successful 
negotiations with this Regency, allowing them to maintain a deterrent force in the 
Mediterranean (Garrity, 2008, pp. 416-426). 
Once the war was over and peace had been established with the North African 
powers, Jefferson’s administration attracted a lot of criticism at home. In reality, 
the costs of war were so high that the president had decided «to reduce the Ameri-
can profile in the region». Under these circumstances, Tobias Lear had to search 
for a not so costly settlement. The problems with Algiers persisted, but the United 
States were only in a position to solve this after the end of the 1812-1814 War 
(Garrity, 2008, pp. 426-430). 
Before this conflict began, as matters were getting worse the United States had to 
withdraw part of their war ships from the Mediterranean, leaving the American ships 
unprotected from the corsairs’ attacks. During the conflict, the United States ships 
almost disappeared from the Mediterranean, the Congress declared war on Algiers, 
and President Madison sent two squadrons to the Mediterranean to impose a treaty to 
the Bey of Tunis and the Pasha of Tripoli (Wright & Macleod, 1945, pp. 202-206). 
It should be noted that due to the waging war between the two major naval 
powers, France and England, from 1805 to 1814, ships flying the flags of the North 
African Regencies were considered neutral and were thus «allowed to navigate 
freely». However, especially after 1808, with the occupation of Spain by the Napo-
leonic armies, many of these war vessels were boarded and «their papers inspected 
by the English» (Panzac, 2005, p. 218). 
In the early 19th century, the commercial fleets of Maghrebian countries grew 
rapidly, with the particularity that the ships used were built in Europe, the majority 
of their crew members, mainly serving as supervisors, were Christians, and that 
they also used European-based contractual methods. This was especially true of 
Tunisians, who competed directly with Christians in maritime shipping. After the 
French Revolution, the reorganization in the Mediterranean trade gave prominence 
to Europe in the Regencies’ international trade. By signing and «setting up transac-
tions and contracts», not only with Europeans, but also with their Muslim partners, 
they made an attempt to become integrated in the Western and international trade. 
As Daniel Panzac puts it, between 1806 and 1812 this policy «began to bear 
fruits», but by 1813 this procedure started to fail (Panzac, 2005, pp. 254-255). 
As this reorganisation failed, the North Africans returned to their privateering 
activities, which they in fact had never abandoned, albeit reduced in the previous 
six years and reaching its peak in 1815. The situation had now become more dan-
gerous for ships of all nationalities (Panzac, 2005, pp. 267-268). 
With the end of this war, the Algerians decided to attack some American ships 
that sailed the Mediterranean. In February 1815, the Congress declared war on Al-
giers, only to discover that the Algerian ships were near the coast of Spain. The 
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Americans tracked them down and engaged in a fierce battle, which they won as 
their weapons were far superior to those of the Algerians. The Americans then 
landed in Algiers and forced the authorities to sign a treaty which abolished the 
payment of any tribute, and took measures for the exchange of prisoners (Panzac 
270-271). Actually, the Dey signed a treaty at the end of 1816, nine months before 
being murdered, and the Algerian corsairs never again posed a threat to the United 
States ships and trade (Wright & Macleod, 1945, pp. 206). After this, the com-
mander of this squadron, Commodore Decatur, travelled to Tunis and Tripoli to re-
sume relations with these powers (Panzac, 2008, pp. 270-271). 
Following all this activity, heightened by the anger at the increase in corsair activi-
ties, the Congress of Vienna condemned Barbary slavery (Panzac, 2008, pp. 272-273). 
After this decision, as Daniel Panzac (2008) wrote, «England, the only true naval pow-
er in the Mediterranean, should take the responsibility for applying that resolution». As 
a consequence thereof, the British fleet in the Mediterranean was given orders to visit 
Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli to notify these regencies of the Congress’s decisions and to 
negotiate the release of the captives, but was not successful (p. 274). This resulted in an 
attack against the capital of Algiers by an Anglo-Dutch fleet in August 1816 that al-
most destroyed the city and its defences. Faced with no alternatives, the Algerians 
signed a treaty, released all the European captives without any ransom, abolished slav-
ery, and even paid the British war reparations. At the same time, the Bey of Tunis and 
the Pasha of Tripoli were informed of this operation and summoned to release any cap-
tives still in their custody.  
According to Daniel Panzac, this event marked the end of corsair activities and 
left bitter feelings in Algiers. Moreover, in 1818 the participants at the Congress of 
Aix-la-Chapelle had discussed this issue and in this international meeting England 
and France were entrusted with the mission of informing all the three regencies 
«that they had to cease all corsair activities or face reprisals from a “European 
League” and assigned to punish them». There was another conflict with England in 
1824, but this time the mission of the British vessels was unsuccessful (Panzac, 
2008, pp. 275-291). 
By the end of the 1820s, for a number of reasons the regencies depended eco-
nomically and politically more and more on Europe. The Americans kept only a 
few vessels in the region for patrolling purposes until 1830, when France occupied 
Algiers (Wright & Macleod, 1945, pp. 202-206). In fact, the 1830s saw the signing 
of the first asymmetric treaties, which addressed the issue of European powers to 
be imposed in Africa and Asia over the next decades of the 19th century (Panzac, 
2008, pp. 332, 334).  
It is extraordinary, however, that as late as 1825 Portugal, Sweden, Denmark 
and Naples were still paying tribute to what we now know was a weakened Algiers 
(Allen, 1905, p. 12). 
 




After the independence, the Americans were on their own in the Mediterranean. 
They could no longer count on the protection of the Royal Navy against the attacks 
of the North African corsairs and had to compete in terms of trade with the far 
more experienced European powers, who, in turn, were also very wary about the 
presence of another competitor’s merchantmen in these waters. These were diffi-
cult times, as the corsair activity that had diminished soon increased again in part 
due to the war waging in Europe after 1793, and the negotiations with the Barbary 
Regencies were very tough. 
We must bear in mind that in 1793 the beginning of war between France, Great-
Britain and other European countries «upset the maritime equilibrium in the Medi-
terranean». It lasted a decade and involved a great number of “naval battles” and 
“sieges of ports”. With the conquest of Egypt by Napoleon, the two centuries and a 
half of good relations between France and the Ottoman Empire came to an end. 
This state of things made the Sultan force the North African powers to wage war 
against France, allowing them to capture French ships, as well as those belonging 
to the annexed countries or to France’s allies. The corsair activity reached its peak 
in 1798, then decreased from 1806 to 1813 and was not able to ramp-up their cam-
paigns between 1814-1815 and virtually came to an end in 1816. Sometimes, this 
“state of war” led to several armed conflicts. (Panzac, 2005, pp. 73-76, 152). 
As a young nation, the United States did not have a strong navy, as for many 
American politicians this was not seen as a priority. At odds with this difficult situ-
ation, the US sometimes were able to count on the help of Europeans, as was the 
case of Portugal until 1807, when the country was invaded by Napoleon’s armies. 
The United States officials eventually realised that a display of force was the best 
way to bring these acts of piracy to an end, so they began to build their own fleet, 
sent warships to the Mediterranean, and waged a war on Tripoli in 1801 and on Al-
giers in 1815. After 1816, the corsairs ceased to be a threat to US ships, and only a 
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